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EPSTEIN

University of Chicago Law School

oday, when most people think of takings
law, they instinctively turn to the nowinfamous 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of
New London. In Kelo, the Supreme Court
held that taking property for economic
redevelopment falls within the public use
language of the Takings Clause. Whatever
its limitations, Kelo was largely a matter of ordinary language
interpretation that did not raise any mind-boggling technical questions. That dubious honor falls to the vexed questions
of deciding when and why certain government actions should
be classified compensable events, and others not.
The keystone of this shaky edifice is the dubious distinction between physical takings and regulatory takings.
Generally speaking, the former involve the occupation of
property by the state or those acting under its authority,
while the latter embrace "mere" restrictions on an owner's
rights of use and disposition for parties whom the state
leaves in possession of their property. This distinction is not
plucked out of the air. It has a powerful political purpose,
which is to downgrade the scope of the just compensation
requirement so that it does little or nothing to interfere with
the ability of land-use planners to implement their vision of
the just or sound community without having to compensate
any landowners caught in the undertow. To aid with this
objective, basic takings law is surrounded by an impressive
array of procedural barriers on such topics as standing ("Do
I have the right to sue?") and exhaustion ("Must the case
remain inside the administrative apparatus?") that must be
hurdled before facing any takings problem on the merits.
It is therefore a source of amazed pleasure to report one
notable exception to this dreary trend just published by Judge
Jay Bybee of the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals. His opinion
in Guggenheim v. City ofGoleta represents a concerted effort to
bring down the fortress that the law has erected to protect
land planners. Instead of getting lost in the forest of irrelevant
Richard A. Epstein is the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of
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distinctions, Bybee breaks with precedent by ordering the City
of Goleta to pay compensation to owners of mobile home
pads on the ground that Goleta's Rent Control Ordinance
(RCO) operates as a regulatory taking.
THE GOLETA RCO

Goleta, CA lies about eight miles to the west of its more famous
neighbor, Santa Barbara, on the Pacific Ocean about 90 miles
northwest of Los Angeles. Land in this desirable location is at
a premium, especially since the city's rigid zoning ordinances
slow down land development, thereby driving up the scarcity
value of usable plots. Back in 1979, when Goleta was an unincorporated area of Santa Barbara County, California passed a
generalized rent control ordinance applicable to mobile home
pads. In effect, the ordinance restricted the rate increase that
pad owners could charge their mobile home tenants. The core
provision of the RCO restricted base increases in the rental
value to 75 percent of the increase in the cost of living index.
Thereafter, it adopted a cumbrous case-by-case process that
allowed various additional increases to landowners who could
prove that their cost increases exceeded that figure.
The precise details of this ordinance are irrelevant to the central problem once it is understood that by conscious design, the
RCO typically sets the rental increases to trail the increases in
underlying land values. As with most stabilization schemes, rent
adjustments are all based on cost figures that never take into
account the changes in demand for the property in question.
Over the past 30 years, the value of the Goleta properties subject to this ordinance tended to rise more rapidly than the
Consumer Price Index, thereby increasing the gap between the
market and rental value more than the rent increase formula
might suggest. Of course, the situation might have been different if increases in property values had lagged below the CPI,
in which case the landowners would have been forced to bear
the decline in land values in the form of lower rents.
It is crystal clear that this, like all other stabilization ordinances, put mobile home tenants at the time of the ruling in
an enviable "heads-I-win-tails-you-1ose" position. As matters
sorted themselves out over time, the rental increases lagged
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far behind the rental value of the premises. Property values
increased over the relevant period by 225 percent, but rental
increases were limited to 75 percent of CPI, resulting in tenants receiving an 80 percent discount relative to market rents.
Those dollars did not disappear. They remained in the pockets of the owners of the rental homes who, under the explicit language of the RCO, could only be evicted for a narrow set
of causes, and who in practice were entitled to remain in
possession of the pads in perpetuity.
The duration of the discount was not, of course, set by the
terms of the lease. Rather, the RCO stipulated that any tenant
who wished to move away was not required meekly to cede
possession of the land back to the landlord where it could be
re-let at market rates. Instead, the RCO allowed the sitting tenant in the immovable mobile home to sell the unit to a buyer
who could then take over the lease (subject to an allowance
that the landlord could increase the rent by 10 percent). Most
of these homes were old and dilapidated, but the opportunity
to stand in the shoes of the prior tenant meant that the
buyer of the mobile home purchased two assets: the beat-up
mobile home and the perpetual lease. Thus it was reliably estimated that the "RCO has resulted in transfer premiums of
approximately 90 percent of the sale price of mobile homes,
enjoyed by the incumbent tenants." Put otherwise, a party
would pay over $100,000 for a mobile home worth $12,000
just to get his hands on the lease. In effect, the state-mandated
extension of the lease resulted in a huge wealth transfer from
the landlord to the initial tenant, who could take his loot out
in one of two fashions: pay low rents or make a profitable sale.
The new tenant did not get any bargain; he just had to pay upfront a substantial portion of the rent to the seller of the
mobile home, who did not own the site, instead of to the landlord who did. As the old song goes, "It's nice work if you can
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get it, and you can get it, at least in Goleta, if you try."
A SIMPLE TAKINGS ANALYSIS

Put yourself in the advantageous position of not knowing
anything about the current constitutional law of takings in
order to understand how this transaction works. First, note that
a simple lease transaction generates two distinct interests out
of one. The owner has the right to reclaim the property at the
expiration of the lease, which is called the reversion interest (i.e.,
the property reverts to the owner), and the right to collect a specified rent during the term of the lease. The lease thus amounts
to a partial sale of the real estate for the duration of the lease.
The purchase price for that term of years could be paid in a
lump sum or over time. Either way, any movement in the value
of the underlying property will work to the tenant's benefit
while the lease is alive, and to the benefit of the landlord once
the lease expires. If the value of the land goes up, the tenant will
enjoy that increase equal to the difference between the present
discounted value of the future use of the land less the current
discounted amount of the rents. The landlord will of course get
a parallel increase in the value of his reversion, which again has
to be discounted to present value.
The RCO changes the economics by extending the lease
beyond its original term at the option of the tenant. Now the
landlord must surrender his reversion, year by year, to the
tenant for rent set below fair rental value. The dollar value of
the take thus depends on the size and duration of the discount
that the RCO forces on the landlord. At this point, the takings
analysis is pretty straightforward: the surrender of the reversion with a market value of, say, $100,000 mandated for a series
of future payments whose present market value is $25,000. In
principle, the $75,000 shortfall has to be made up by the City
of Goleta, which does not have that kind of money in its
REGULATION WINTER 2009-2010
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treasury. The legal analysis calling for compensation under the
Takings Clause just tracks the economics. Goleta may decide
to pay in a lump sum or in installments, but pay it must.
RENT CONTROL UNDER THE CURRENT LAW
The analysis of this problem assumes surrealist dimensions
under the current law. The initial threshold involves the various procedural questions that often prevent courts from ever
reaching the merits of the underlying case. In Guggenheim, the
first of these obstacles relates to standing: how and when can
the pad owner show a pocketbook interest that is hurt by the
RCO? That issue is complicated in cases like this when the
named plaintiff acquired the property in 1997, which is 18 years
after the ordinance was adopted and 10 years after it was
amended. Does he get the right to bring the lawsuit, or did that
cause of action belong to the property owners as of 1979?
If the then-owner of the land had sued in 1979 for a taking under the above theory, that should have been the end of
it. If he had won, he would have received a recovery equal to
the value that he lost in the forced extension of the lease. Once
he put that money in his pocket, he would have then completed the sale to the current owners, who would have paid
(and did pay) a reduced price to reflect the diminished rentals
left under the ordinance. All the accounts would be square,
and it would be a miscarriage ofjustice to allow the buyer of
the land to recover a second time for the losses inflicted by the
regulation. Alternatively, if the 1979 owner had lost his suit,
the matter would have been resolved, as the rules on the
finality of litigation allow any landowner and his successors
in title only one bite at the apple.
The plot thickens, however, when the first party does not
or cannot bring the suit. One way to close the case is to hold
that the statute of limitations has run out, so that the claim
of the present owner is barred. The difficulty with this point
of view is that it is often far from clear whether the then-owner
would have been allowed to challenge the RCO at that time.
In the Guggenheim decision, Judge Bybee does not discuss
the statute of limitations question. He just assumes that the
claim survives, only to ask whether the right to challenge the
RCO passes to the buyer on the landlord's sale. This question
can be resolved in only one of two ways: The first assumes that
the seller let the claim die at sale, even if it had some chance
of success. The second assumes that he assigns his claim to
the buyer along with his reversionary interest in the property. From a self-interested point of view, the only plausible
assumption is the second, because no rational party wants to
make gifts to strangers, least of all the city that has taken him
to the financial cleaners. Hence, the buyer of the landlord's
interest stands in the shoes of the seller, his claim for just compensation intact, as Judge Bybee rightly held.
Yet when can this claim be brought? The conventional
wisdom says only after all administrative remedies have been
exhausted, which quickly becomes a marathon as savvy local
governments string out their internal review processes. That
endless delay is not tolerated in such areas as free speech, but
for land-use cases, the ill-conceived 1985 Supreme Court
decision in Williamson County Regional PlanningCommission v.
6
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Bank ofHamilton raises administrative review to an art form,
often extending a generation or more. Yet no compensation
is owed for the loss of use in the interim, for the Supreme
Court has decreed that "normal delays" in local land-use
proceedings are outside the Takings Clause.
Judge Bybee, however, performed a nifty end run around
the Williamson exhaustion requirement. He noted that this rule
only applied to challenges of local government decisions
made on an "as applied" basis - that is, those challenges that
turn on the peculiar way the law applies to the distinct facts
at hand. But other Supreme Court cases have recognized
that there is no reason to countenance these delays to facial
challenges that only require a landowner to "demonstrate that
the mere enactment of the ordinance constitutes a taking,"
which in Bybee's view it does, given the implicit transfer of
wealth incident to the passage of the RCO.
That last point is an audacious shocker because in the last
several generations the courts have never sustained a facial takings challenge to a statute under the Takings Clause. For
example, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Association (1981), the Court refused to entertain a challenge
to a conservation statute that required all strip miners to
restore the land to its "original contour" once their work
was finished. So long as the burden, if any, could not be
determined until the end of the reclamation project, the
challenge was only timely at the end of the process, not when
the statute was enacted.
TAKINGS: PHYSICAL AND REGULATORY
One of the major difficulties in Guggenheim is that it does not
represent the first challenge to the Goleta RCO. The entire
scheme has long been a target of disgruntled owners of mobile
home sites. In the first of these challenges, the 1987 opinion
of Hall v. City of SantaBarbara,Judge Alex Kozinski faced the
serious problem that rent control statutes had long been held
constitutional even though they limited the right of the landlord to evict a tenant at the end of the term. He distinguished
the mobile home case from the standard rent control case by
noting that only in the former does the tenant plop his independent property on the plaintiff's land. The decision in his
view counted as a physical taking of the land, which was not
present in the ordinary rent control case where the tenant stays
on at the protected rent at the expiration of the term.
As an economic matter, that charming evasion makes no
sense because the expropriation of the landlord's interest is
every bit as blatant in the conventional rent control case as in
the exotic mobile home variant. In both cases the owner is
demoted from the holder of an equity, who benefits from all
appreciation in land prices, to a composite owner/creditor,
who gets none of the appreciation but who would take all of
the loss if land prices fall.
Kozinski's Hall solution had only a short half-life. When
the identical issue reached the Supreme Court in the 1992 case
of Yee v. Escondido Village, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor had a
very different take on the plaintiff's effort to exploit the now
well-established distinction between physical and regulatory
takings. Rather than hew to the Kozinski line, she rejected the

view that the RCo worked a physical taking at all. Instead, she
treated it as a mere restraint on the right to use or dispose of
the pad, which falls within the class of regulatory takings.
In so doing, Justice O'Connor took a page from Alice in
Wonderland by insisting the per se takings rule for physical
takings only applies where an RCO "requires the landowner to
submit to the physical occupation of his land." That, she insisted, did not happen here because the landowners "voluntarily
rented their land to mobile home owners." She then tells a little white lie by saying that "neither the city nor the State compels [pad owners], once they have rented their property to tenants, to continue doing so." The sole ground for that statement
was that the ordinance allowed the landlord to give between six
and 12 months notice before evicting tenants if they wished to
change their land use, which of course they do not. The RCO,
however, makes it crystal clear that the only grounds for eviction are contained in the ordinance; getting the property back

extent to which it interferes with "investment-backed expectations," an elusive substitute for the constitutional words
"private property," coined for the occasion. The bottom line
was that regulatory takings required "ad hoc determinations"
based on all the relevant factors, which in this case had to be
decided for the City on the ground that Penn Central could
still make money operating the terminal even if not free to
develop its air rights.
Two features from Penn Central carry over to this case.
First, the facts showed that the mobile home landowners
still enjoyed a rate of return of around 10 percent, which
meets the state's obligation under Penn Central.Second, in all
the post-Penn Centralcases, the "ad hoc" nature of the inquiry
precluded the facial challenge that Judge Bybee adopted.
That is especially true with those weird investment-backed
expectations, which on some occasions the Supreme Court
has gone so far as to say means that anyone who buys any

Judge Bybee was visibly-and rightly-angry
at the explicit and deliberate wealth transfer
that the so-called regulation produced.
at the expiration of the original term is not one of those
grounds. In light of that simple truth, her position is necessarily
that the law is entitled to give tenants valuable options to
renew for free at a fixed rate, such that a lease for a year and a
lease for 100 years should be treated in the same way. One sleight
of hand thus undoes centuries of property law that have uniformly held that leases expire at the end of their terms unless
renewed by mutual consent.
Once finished with her flight of property law fancy, Justice
O'Connor then notes that the landowners did not raise any
regulatory takings claim, so Yee sputtered to an early and
inglorious end. It was that last observation, however, that
opened the way for the plaintiffs in Guggenheim to trot out
their novel theory that this RCO should be treated as a per se
regulatory taking, restricting land use, because of the immediate wealth transfer it works between the parties.
The genesis of the regulatory takings test is Justice
Brennan's 1978 decision in Penn Central TransportationCo. v.
City ofNew York, which upheld New York's landmark presetvarion statute that was used, without compensation, to block
the construction of a fancy new Marcel Breuer tower atop New
York's Grand Central Station. As a technical matter, Penn
Centralis manifestly wrong because it demotes Penn Central's
air rights, which are fully recognized under New York law, to
a mere part of the parcel that lay below it. That redefinition
allowed Justice Brennan to conclude that physical invasions
are "more readily" to be found takings than mere regulations, which are examined by a two-part test that looks first
to the economic impact of the regulation and next at the

property with notice that certain regulations are in place
cannot protest the takings, which would doom the Guggenheim
challenge. Some other cases treat the notice as irrelevant to
the case, on the sensible ground that all real property would
be rendered practically inalienable if its sale necessarily blocked
the new owner's future challenge to an existing ordinance that
was not ripe - i.e., ready for judicial challenge - when the
transfer was made. Finally, others treat notice as a factor to be
taken into account. Any which way, current law does not
support the per se regulatory challenge.
FINAL REFLECTIONS
Why did Judge Bybee bite off more than he could chew?
Because he was visibly - and rightly - angry at the explicit
and deliberate wealth transfer that the so-called regulation
worked on the date of its inception. But how does that distinguish the case from all the landmark preservation zoning
cases that usually survive the "as applied" challenges raised
against them? His answer is that the direct transfer of the benefit to the determinate person on the opposite side of the
transaction is sharply distinguishable from the diffuse set of
public benefits that come from a landmark designation or
zoning statute. In his view, the concentrated benefits under
the RCO render it vulnerable to challenges that preservation
and zoning laws escape.
Ponder the implications. If Bybee is right, then all rent control statutes must fall, given that their restrictions necessarily result in a wealth transfer as well, which can sometimes be
transferred within families at death. This approach flouts the
REGULATION WINTER 2009-2010
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basic logic of the takings law, which holds that we should
always look to the loss of the owner and not to the gain of the
state or those with whom it deals. Take that as a given, and
Bybee's startling new rule subjects all land-use regulation to
per se review so long as the rules work implicit wealth transfers, which they always do.
I regardJudge Bybee's ingenious truncation ofPenn Central
as reason enough for the Supreme Court to take this case. The
question is what they should do with it. Judged by the normal canons of judicial review, the likely outcome is that the
Court will do to Bybee in Guggenheim what it did to Judge
Kozinski: reverse and enter judgment for the defendant. If Yee
and Penn Centralare rightly decided, Bybee's opinion will die
an inglorious death. But that would be a pity because there
is not a shred of sensible economic analysis in either Penn
Centralor Yee, let alone the economic literature that falsifies,
on either descriptive or normative grounds, Judge Bybee's central claim that the Goleta RCO works an illicit wealth transfer from landlords to tenants.
There is of course another way. One ofJustice Scalia's prescient remarks in his 1988 dissent in Pennellv. City ofSanJose
was to identify a good and a bad way to make these implicit
transfers. The bad way is to sock it to the landlords, who often
do not live in the city that makes the laws, and who, if they
do, are in any event outvoted by tenants lining their own
pockets. Local ardor for transfers to a discrete group of ten-

ants will die off if the taxpayer voters have to foot the bill for
this enormous subsidy instead of imposing it on the landlord
minority. That one simple requirement forces a level of democratic accountability, which will in turn generate the level of
transparency needed for the responsible deliberation over
social alternatives that so many communitarians prize. And
that result could be happily reached if the Court recognizes
and repudiates the incoherence of Justice O'Connor's preposterous claim that a lease for a year could be converted by
a snap of legislative fingers into a perpetual lease. Describing
the mobile home owner's perpetual occupation of the pad
against the will of its owner as a mere regulatory taking is
intellectually bankrupt.
For good measure, the Court should also reconsider its
moribund decision in Penn Centralthat strips air rights of
all constitutional protection. That one indefensible move
shows just how far the takings law has strayed from its private law roots.
We now know why current takings law is "hard." It abandons every coherent conception of private property in its misguided effort to allow governments and their planning commissions to run roughshod over discrete and insular minorities
within their communities. If the multiple technical deficiencies in Judge Bybee's Guggenheim opinion forces the Supreme
Court to confront the poverty of its own takings jurisprudence,
his errors will not have been made in vain.
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